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Abstract This article considers professionalization as a
governance strategy for synthetic biology, reporting on
social science interviews done with scientists, science
journal editors, members of science advisory boards and
authors of nongovernmental policy reports on synthetic
biology. After summarizing their observations about the
potential advantages and disadvantages of the profession-
alization of synthetic biology, we analyze professionali-
zation as a strategy that overcomes dichotomies found in
the current debates about synthetic biology governance,
speciﬁcally ‘‘top down’’ versus ‘‘bottom up’’ governance
and scientiﬁc fact versus public values. Professionalization
combines community and state, fact and value. Like all
governance options, professionalization has limitations,
particularly regarding war and peace. It is best conceptu-
alized as potentially part of a wider range of governance
mechanisms working in concert: a ‘‘web of prevention’’.
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The emergence of synthetic biology has resulted in con-
troversy over the governance structures of the life sciences,
particularly genetic and genomic research. A number of
governance methods have been debated with the aim to
harmonize the development of synthetic biology with
objectives variously posed as human health, national
security, environmental safety, scientiﬁc freedom/progress,
and economic growth. Proposals for synthetic biology
governance have, inter alia, called for (new) codes of
conduct for scientists, increased education of scientists
regarding social and ethical implications of science,
improved biosafety standards, security reviews of experi-
ments and publications, governmental oversight of experi-
ments and publications, restrictions on the selling of
dangerous pathogens (called Select Agents in the USA)
and/or potentially dangerous DNA sequences, registration
of DNA synthesizers and other relevant technology,
licensing and/or security-screening of those working with
such technology, and strengthening of the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention (e.g., to include veriﬁcation
mechanisms). Synthetic biologists and other life scientists
have throughout these governance discussions consistently
emphasized the need for initiatives that sustain the dyna-
mism of science through open inquiry and international
collaborations (Institute of Medicine and National Research
Council 2006).
In this article we call attention to professionalization as
a governance strategy for synthetic biology, one that has
received mention but no real discussion in the literature.
The topic of professionalizing synthetic biology arose
during research interviews for our social science project
investigating synthetic biology and biosecurity. In these
interviews life scientists, editors of science journals, and
the authors of US policy reports on synthetic biology
remarked favourably and unfavourably about the potential
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thetic biology. We report this ﬁnding from research-
in-progress so that it may broaden the ongoing governance
discussions with respect to synthetic biology.
In most jurisdictions a profession is a legally mandated
association granted a monopoly over specialized practices,
a delimited authority delegated by sovereign states. Pro-
fessional organizations require statutory legislation that
constitutes colleges with broad powers. The ofﬁcers of the
colleges are elected by members of the college and are
expected to become advocates for the profession. All
professional practitioners are licensed and belong to an
association/college which sets standards of practice for its
members. To be licensed a practitioner must undergo
education and training required by the college and,
increasingly, ongoing education. The registrars of colleges
license practitioners and may also initiate hearings into the
professional conduct of licensed practitioners, hearings that
may order anything from dismissal of the charges to deli-
censing of the practitioner. The legal structure and powers
granted a profession are intended to align expert practices
with the public good. We do not herein discuss those
professional societies that are not authorized by statutory
law and which have no licensing requirements. These
function primarily as advocacy organizations and do not
have the organizational capacity to mediate between spe-
cialized expertise and public values in the manner of the
professional organizations mandated by statutory law that
we discuss here.
Professionalization as an option for synthetic biology
governance bypasses the simplistic dichotomy of ‘‘bottom
up’’ and ‘‘top down’’ governance. It links the beneﬁts of
ﬂexible self-governance to a public policy and legal
framework. We argue that one of the strengths of profes-
sionalization as a mode of governance lies in its ability to
bridge between science and public values. Although we do
not take a position for or against professionalization, we do
hold that expanding the range of available governance
strategies is urgently needed. Professionalization would
need to be coordinated with other forms of governance to
operate effectively, including distinctively sovereign,
political interventions related to, for instance, international
biochemical weapons treaties.
This article reports on research in progress in a project
investigating governance models for synthetic biology in
relation to biosecurity. An initial set of 14 key informant
interviews, one by telephone and 13 in person usually at
participants’ places of work, took place during February
and June 2008. Lasting 60–150 min, the interviews were
recorded and later transcribed. Research participants’ per-
sonal identities are anonymized here, though some waived
conﬁdentiality. The following groups were purposively
sampled: (1) synthetic and molecular biologists; (2)
contributors to the policy debate, including authors of
governmental and nongovernmental reports on synthetic
biology governance. The two classical molecular biologists
in the sample had performed what subsequently came to be
regarded as experiments of concern discussed in the gov-
ernance literature on synthetic biology. The participants
were drawn from the following areas of scientiﬁc, gov-
ernmental and nongovernmental practice, with overlapping
memberships so that the total exceeds 14: nine research
participants are practicing synthetic biologists (7) and
classical molecular biologists (2); two are editors of jour-
nals that published experiments of concern; two are
members of the US National Science Advisory Board for
Biosecurity (NSABB); one had been on the Fink Com-
mittee; two are authors of nongovernmental reports on
synthetic biology; one is a member of a civil society
organization, and one a bioethicist.
Our research participants were treated as key infor-
mants, meaning ‘‘people who are particularly knowledge-
able about the inquiry and articulate about their
knowledge’’ (Patton 2002, p. 321). This approach to
research interviewing provides a means of documenting
interpretations, reﬂections, histories, and motivations that
do not appear in written articles and reports where authors
must speak on record and authoritatively. Because quali-
tative research such as this does not use the kind of sam-
pling used in quantitative studies, our data does not permit
generalizing about how many or what proportion of syn-
thetic biologists support professionalization. Rather than
statistical analysis, the purpose of this article is to report and
analyze what was said about professionalization by a
number of highly knowledgeable people who have partici-
pated in the debate about synthetic biology governance.
This ﬁnding is of interest because the professionalization of
synthetic biology has not previously received substantial
published discussion.
Professionalizing synthetic biology: making scientists
think like doctors
Professionalization may be seen as a strategy for making
scientists think and act like doctors. Participants in our
study represented science as a discovery-oriented, amoral
pursuit of knowledge, while the professions, particularly
medicine, were understood to link expert knowledge with
moral obligation. One participant commented: ‘‘[t]here
was this conversation in the Fink Committee about, well,
scientists don’t think like doctors. And physicians have –
this is the argument – [a] well worked out understanding
of their moral obligations, their ﬁduciary duties as
professionals and so on. Scientists have one overriding
value, and that is the … pursuit of new knowledge’’
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1 04). Another participant, a physician-scientist, also
posed the distinction between science and the professions
in moral terms, contrasting medical students with gradu-
ate students in the sciences. Medical students, the par-
ticipant observed, have a deep sense of doing no harm to
patients whereas, in scientiﬁc experiments, ‘‘[t]he gradu-
ate students don’t get it just yet. They don’t stop to think
about what’s the potential impact of this particular set of
experiments. They just don’t. And I don’t even yet’’
(RP 01).
Some research participants viewed professionalization
as a way of rendering synthetic biology compatible with
public health, national security, and public accountability.
Others doubted that professionalization would have any
effect on national security and environmental safety. A
journal editor and scientist argued that the life sciences
have only now reached a stage of industrialization that
chemical engineering attained decades ago:
This is really new stuff for life scientists. Engineers
have been doing these kinds of things which affect
populations for a very long period of time… I would
not consider that [professionalization]
2 to be intrusive
to the conduct of research. I would think it would be a
recognition of what this research means to society
(RP 02).
Another scientist suggested that making synthetic biology
into a profession would ‘‘be relevant to biosecurity’’
because a profession could ‘‘establish standards of practice
and then hold people accountable to them’’ (RP 10). A
bioethicist was skeptical that professionalization would
have any national security or environmental beneﬁts,
asking what is the problem to which professionalization
might be the solution:
You need a map of what are the concerns and wor-
ries. And what are the cultural and institutional
responses that make the most sense for a particular
worry. So I’m not sure, for example, that increased
professionalization is a very efﬁcient or … a very
effective response to, say, a worry about dual use or a
worry about environmental hazards. Professionaliza-
tion understood simply to be that there’s a recogni-
tion that you have a kind of accountability as a
profession to society. You could go a long way in that
direction (RP 04).
This research participant treats professionalization as an
ineffective response to biosecurity and environmental
questions, but an appropriate one if the intent is to render
synthetic biology publicly accountable.
Insyntheticbiologytodaycertainscientistsdo‘‘thinklike
doctors’’: engineers. Synthetic biology integrates engineer-
ing, which is already organized as a profession, with the life
sciences, which are not. As one scientist observed, ‘‘[o]ne of
the most interesting things happening in synthetic biology is
thatthereareengineersofallsortsswarmingintobiologyand
that is a different culture than a scientiﬁc culture’’ (RP 10).
This participant differentiated the life sciences from engi-
neering in their cultural orientations, science being about
‘‘discovery and understanding and curiosity’’, whereas in
engineering ‘‘we try and make stuff based on limited
understanding and limited resources and limited abilities to
manipulate the physical world’’ (RP 10).
Unlike synthetic biologists trained primarily in the life
sciences, those synthetic biologists educated as engineers
are familiar with professional societies because engineer-
ing has been organized as a profession in most Euro-
American jurisdictions since the nineteenth century. Their
familiarity with engineering led them to suggest a series of
analogies between the engineering profession and the
future governance of synthetic biology. As the anthropo-
logist Strathern (1992, p. 152) has demonstrated, analogy
operates as a form of borrowing between discrete domains
of social practice, ‘‘a conserving exercise in so far as new
entities or ways of thinking are built up through already
existing ones.’’ Synthetic biologists from an engineering
background are accustomed to licensing and their work
being subject to oversight. Professions have the legal
authority to develop standards of practice, and failure to
abide by the professional standard of practice may jeo-
pardize a practitioner’s license. Engineers sign their work,
rendering them at least potentially liable if it should be
defective. This professional system of incentives and
penalties is not found in the life sciences, but can be
extended by analogy to them.
Bridge building is an example that study participants
repeatedly used to explain the effects of professionalization
on engineering practices. Engineers, one participant noted,
are licensed and will ‘‘be held accountable when the bridge
falls down’’ (RP 10). By analogy, if synthetic biology were
to become a profession, its practitioners would become
accountable for their work: their bridges would have to
stand up. However, another participant rejected bridge
building as a model for biological research:
[I]t’s important for them to recognize – the engi-
neering side of the world – that … in the biological
world it’s a different kind of research outcome than
building a bridge where you have a certain set of
rigorous standards within which you have to operate
such that the bridge doesn’t fall down. It’s not just a
‘‘Hey! Let’s see what we can build’’ kind of thing’’
(RP 01).
1 ‘‘RP’’ is an abbreviation for ‘‘research participant’’.
2 Square brackets indicate additional words inserted for clariﬁcation.
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of medicine in therapeutic practice, it was counterintuitive
for this participant to consider him/herself a bridge builder.
Using engineering as a governance model for synthetic
biology gives rise to a series of partial and contested
analogies.
One scientist argued that professional licensing would be
appropriate for synthetic biologists working on projects that
involve environmental release of synthetic organisms,
though not for basic research conducted in laboratories that
would have no environmental release. All synthetic organ-
ismsreleasedoutsidethelaboratory,itwassuggested,should
be ‘signed’ in a fashion analogous to the way engineers
currently sign their work: ‘‘[What] I’d like to see would be a
professional standard of practice that genetic engineers sign
their work and that translates practically into things being
embedded into the DNA itself. These standards would
include standards for detection within the environment and
also attribution’’ (RP 10). On analogy with engineering,
‘‘signing’’ synthetic organisms would involve DNA inser-
tions that could be linked to a code that would personally
identify scientists. A second participant linked ‘‘signing’’
organisms with cultural differences between engineers and
biologists, again using the bridge building analogy:
One of the cultural differences between engineers and
biologists is that – and actually I still have trouble
with whether this is literally true – engineers sign
their works. If a bridge falls down, presumably you
know where that bridge came from, because there’s a
paper trail saying, ‘‘You people are responsible.’’ The
parallel that people try to make is with someone who
makes a pathogen. There’s no signature there, and
you don’t know who’s done that (RP 11).
One scientist questioned the appropriateness of any envi-
ronmental release, signed or otherwise, of synthetic and
genetically modiﬁed organisms that would involve ani-
mals: ‘‘[a] virus that is released …into an environmental
area where there are animals that you can’t bring back or
control, that would have to be a concern. That is never
actually addressed at government or gene regulatory
authority or anything like that’’ (RP 13). The idea that
‘‘signing’’ is a solution is here contested on ecological
grounds.
Professions commonly have a code of ethics that acts as
a statement of the fundamental goals—or ‘‘calling’’—of
the profession and as a normative guide for practitioners.
Codes of ethics differ from the ‘‘codes of conduct’’ that
have been more widely discussed as a governance option
for synthetic biology (Garﬁnkel et al. 2007; Mauer et al.
2006) as they appear in a professional context rather than
being stand-alone documents. Professional codes of ethics
are incorporated in practitioner education and they may
also be used in disciplinary hearings before a college’s
registrar or in courts of law—for example, when plaintiffs
make charges of ‘‘negligence’’ because ‘‘standards of
practice’’ have not been met.
One participant objected to professionalization as a
governance strategy, arguing that scientists would not in
principle be able to conform to codes of ethics:
This question of a license: I go in and then I have to
pass an examination, like an MD. And then I’m
allowed to do research. And there is a code of ethics
and it says: ‘‘You do not produce anything that can do
harm to somebody’’. The problem is, in research, you
don’t really know when you do an experiment what
the outcome is. You don’t really know if, in ﬁve
years, it could be a horrible result, like the mousepox
virus. The people who put this together, they had no
inkling that this could be a virus that would kill
vaccinated animals (RP 05).
We note that some codes are currently drafted to oblige
members to make an effort to identify reasonably foresee-
able outcomes before starting work and to take outcomes
into account when planning, conducting and reporting
research (Green et al. 2006).
A physician research participant said that codes of
conduct ‘‘have absolutely no inﬂuence over somebody
intent on doing the wrong thing. No question about it’’
(RP 01). But in the case of medicine, the code of ethics that
‘‘we give to our medical students when they get their lab
coat on the ﬁrst day of school and the code of conduct we
say at graduation four or six years later… gets so ingrained
in our medical students’’ (RP 01). Ethics modules are
compulsory parts of medical education, integrated into it
from the ﬁrst day of medical school.
Analytic observations
Fromtheseremarksofourresearchparticipants,anumberof
analytic points may be drawn about professionalization as a
governance strategy for synthetic biology. First, profes-
sionalization breaks with the strong polarization between
science-community-based and state-based regulation that
has characterized so much discussion about the governance
of synthetic biology. Professional organization contains
elements of both self-governance and legally-authorized,
politically mandated governance, what people informally
todayterm‘‘bottomup’’versus‘‘topdown’’governance.The
powers of college registrars to investigate claims against
practitioners, order remediation, and delicense practitioners
illustrate the top down side of professional governance. The
combination of legislated mandate and collegial self-gov-
ernance provides a ﬂexible mechanism of professional
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vidualpractitioners.Second,professionalizationisastrategy
for constructing the synthetic biologist as a responsible
subject. This would extend and formalize already existing
community discussion about integrating scientiﬁc practice
with ethical and social obligations. A profession deﬁnes the
ﬁduciaryresponsibilitiesofpractitionerstoclientsandofthe
profession to public good. It assures adequate educational
standards for its practitioners both at the point of licensing
and through educational programmes after licensing. Pro-
fessionsacttocreatecompetentpractitionersandtodealwith
incompetent ones. By these means professions socially
demonstrate that their practitioners are adhering to the eth-
ical obligations with which they have been entrusted. Third,
professionalization islinkedtothe formationofan ethos.By
ethoswemeanthesenseofattachmentandcommitmentthat
persons feel to the groups of which they form part (Bendix
1960, pp. 260–261). The formation of a professional ethos
for synthetic biology would involve the emergence of a
distinctive way of thinking and feeling for members of that
profession. The professional ethos would also orient syn-
thetic biologists to their work as an ongoing ethical task.
3
Our fourth analytic point is that professionalization
provides a means of addressing one of the fundamental
dilemmas in present governance discussion about synthetic
biology: the linking of fact and value without damaging the
conduct of scientiﬁc research. Almost a century ago Max
Weber (one of the founding ﬁgures of sociology), in a
famous paper entitled ‘‘Science as Vocation’’ (Wissen-
schaft als Beruf; Weber 1958 [1922]), argued that science
is a type of formal, value-free rationality. Formal ratio-
nality is one way of integrating the goals of human action
with the means used to attain these goals. It analyses the
means and calculates the relation between means and
goals, but takes the goals of action as given. As a type of
formal rationality, science does not reason about the goals
of its practices and cannot give answers about what it
should do. In Weber’s (1958, p. 144) words: ‘‘Natural
science gives us an answer to the question of what we must
do if we wish to master life technically. It leaves quite
aside, or assumes for its purposes, whether we should and
do wish to master life technically and whether it makes
sense to do so.’’
4 When values are conceived as coming to
science from without, scientiﬁc knowledge is confronted
with a number of paradoxes. For instance, Weber argues,
the assumption that scientiﬁc knowledge is worth knowing
is actually a statement of value that science cannot prove.
Nor can the value of the technical mastery of life be
established through scientiﬁc reasoning. Scientiﬁc know-
ledge, moreover, is incapable of arbitrating conﬂicting
value commitments. In principle synthetic biology, like any
science, cannot itself establish a conception of the good
society and what the place of science in such a society
ought to be.
One of the merits of professionalization as a governance
strategy for synthetic biology lies in its capacity to articu-
late the formal, amoral reasoning of science with nor-
mative professional standards and substantive values.
Professionalization would have the effect of opening a
space of accountability under a legislative mandate that
established a college of synthetic biologists. A profession-
alized synthetic biology would provide a practical context
for devising and enforcing standards of practice and codes
of ethics.
It would be naı ¨ve to think that professions inevitably
align with the public good. Fiduciary responsibilities to
clients and the public are counterbalanced by promoting
the beneﬁt of the profession and the individual practitioner.
Professions are inherently ﬁelds of normative conﬂict
between the interests of the profession, the interests of the
practitioner, and the public good. Professional practitioners
tend to deal with incompetent practitioners by forming
internal referral networks to protect their clients, that is,
through evasion rather than report to the college registrar.
In addition, professional organization creates stratiﬁcation
among forms of expert labour, with professions ranked at
the top. How this would affect the place of synthetic
biology among the life sciences is presently unknown.
Professionalization is no panacea for the governance
challenges facing synthetic biology today.
Professionalization in a web of prevention
Professionalization may gain popularity among synthetic
biologists if social and ultimately political sentiment
proves unwilling to tolerate a completely ‘‘bottom up’’,
voluntary approach to synthetic biology governance given
the apparent biosafety and biosecurity risks associated with
this area of science and technology. If they were given the
choice between professionalization and regulation by
government, synthetic biologists would likely prefer the
former, as this would appear to protect a greater measure of
scientiﬁc autonomy.
Even if professionalization takes place, this would not
mean that there would then be no need for governmental
3 For a discussion of ethos see Foucault (1997, p. 309).
4 Since the publication of Weber’s ‘‘Vocation of Science’’ in 1922,
much has changed in science. After the bombing of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, some scientists became public intellectuals and took on
advocacy for nuclear non-proliferation. Later Rachel Carson’s Silent
Spring (1962) initiated a new role for scientists qua scientists taking
positions on ecological matters such as climate change, damage to the
world’s oceans, and the destruction of plant and animal species. These
are instances of scientists taking substantive value positions in a way
not anticipated by Weber.
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up’’ and ‘‘top down’’ governance amounts to a false dichot-
omy, so may the choice between professionalization and a
‘‘topdown’’regime.Theprofessionalizationofmedicine,by
analogy, has not meant that doctors have only the medical
profession to answer to. Governmental bodies also play a
major role in the regulation of medicine. In the US, for
example, FDA approval is required for the licensing and
marketing of drugs—and abortion is only permitted because
the Supreme Court ruled that state prohibitions against it
would be unconstitutional given the right to privacy. Sub-
stantial control over medicine is also held by other institu-
tions such as private insurance companies, particularly in
those jurisdictions with limited or non-existent state-
provided health care. In the context of medicine, profes-
sionalizationisanimportantpartofgovernance—butitisnot
the whole story. The same arguably would, and should, be
true in the context of synthetic biology.
One of the major societal concerns about synthetic
biology is the dual-use nature of this kind of science and
technology. Techniques used to design new organisms or
re-design existing ones may have numerous signiﬁcant
beneﬁts for humankind. But the same techniques might be
used by malevolent actors in the production and use of
biological weapons that pose serious threats to human
health and security. Since all synthetic biology techniques
may be argued to be inherently dual use, the boundary
between what is of concern to the public good and what is
not poses great conceptual difﬁculties.
The protection of security is usually considered to be a
key role of government (Miller and Selgelid 2008), and it
would thus be surprising—and perhaps imprudent—for
governments to leave all (relevant) control over security in
the hands of the synthetic biology profession itself
(Selgelid 2007). Some degree of government oversight not
mediated through professional societies will be necessary.
Under the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 all sov-
ereign states have the legally binding obligation to ensure
that nuclear, chemical or biological weapons are not
developed, acquired or used inside their territories by non-
state actors (United Nations Security Council Resolution
1540 2004). It can be expected that professional organi-
zation would exert some control over unlicensed hackers
and amateurs, but it would not be capable of completely
preventing research, development and deliberate use of
synthesized pathogens. The question of bioweapons is a
largely a matter of international law and state sovereignty,
not merely a matter of professional regulation.
The upshot of this discussion is that it would be mis-
taken to think that professionalization of synthetic biology,
whatever its merits, would be a magic bullet for solving
biosecurity issues. A growing consensus in the literature
on the dual-use phenomenon and biological weapons
prevention holds that a complex ‘‘web of prevention’’ is
needed for the protection of biosecurity (Rappert and
McLeish 2007;Dando 2008). Rather than choosing between
thevariousgovernanceoptionslistedatthebeginningofthis
paper and/or professionalization, biosecurity may require
reliance on (elements of) many governance modes acting in
synergistic combination. Professionalization of synthetic
biology could be a good thing—but some degree of gov-
ernmental oversight, the strengthening of relevant weapons
conventions,regulationoftrade/transfer,andpossessionand
use of dual-use materials and technology will still be
necessary.
Conclusion
This article has summarized the reﬂections on profession-
alization that our research participants made in the context
of a project still in progress. We have analyzed profes-
sionalization as a governance form that overcomes some of
the polarities found in current debates about synthetic
biology governance, in particular top down versus bottom
up governance and scientiﬁc fact versus public values.
Professionalization combines community and state, fact
and value. However, professional organization does not
supersede the polarity around bottom up and top down
governance, which continues to represent signiﬁcant posi-
tions in a social and political debate. We have also argued
that professionalization ought to be conceptualized as part
of a wider range of governance mechanisms working in
concert, but that professionalization has at most an ancil-
lary role to play in questions of war and peace. Professions
do not sign international bioweapons conventions or trea-
ties providing global, post-national mechanisms for dealing
with international public health emergencies that would
result from accidental or deliberate bioweapons use (Weir
and Mykhalovskiy 2009). Like all governance options,
professionalization has limitations.
The beginnings of synthetic biology occurred in the
USA. It ﬁrst became visible to those outside the small
number of its practitioners in the post-9/11 political land-
scape. Early discussions of synthetic biology governance
thus took place amidst the security agenda of the Bush
administration. Under these conditions, scientists rallied to
defend scientiﬁc research, publishing, and international
collaborations against measures being contemplated in the
name of security. The end of the Bush years may create the
conditions for less defensive participation by scientists in
discussions about synthetic biology governance. Perhaps it
is the creation of ongoing spaces of reﬂection and debate
that are most needed now, as a scientist remarked to us:
‘‘Given the fact that the underlying technologies are
changing so dramatically…, it becomes unbelievably
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mechanisms that support dialogue, both in terms of gov-
ernance, bottom up and top down, but also in terms of
ethical issues … Long-term persistent constructive dis-
cussion seems critical’’ (RP 10).
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